The endgame of this original “re-democratization from the inside” were two referendums: the presidential plebiscite of October 5, 1988 and the constitutional plebiscite of July 30, 1989. From a historical perspective, both referendums consolidated the Chilean Model. 

 

The presidential plebiscite of 1988

 

As a pragmatic mechanism to reach universal suffrage in this exceptional circumstances, provisional Article 27 of the 1980 Constitution established the obligation to hold a presidential plebiscite in 1988, at the end of the period of democratic refoundation. In this referendum, the people would vote “Yes” or “No” to the presidential candidate to be proposed by the Government Junta.  Provisional Article 28 stated that if this candidate were approved in the referendum, then the president would “call a general election of senators and representatives… and Congress will be in session three months after the elections”. Provisional Article 29 stated that if such candidate were rejected, then the president will “call presidential and congressional elections in accordance with the permanent articles of this Constitution and with the law”. In this way, these two articles assured the advent of democracy in Chile regardless of the outcome of this referendum. 

 

It is necessary to highlight a fact of extraordinary importance: from the inauguration of the constitutional government on March 11, 1981, any reform of the constitution required ratification by a popular referendum. This renouncing of constitutional power by the government ensured that the path towards democracy was irreversible.

 

The 1988 plebiscite was then to determine the person who will hold the presidency for the next term, but it did not alter the fundamental fact that, regardless of the outcome of the referendum, a democracy was to be established in a few months. In this way, the government distanced itself from the illegitimate practice, common to plebiscites, of pressuring citizens to approve decisions by suggesting that rejecting them would lead to “instability or even chaos”. In fact, the argument for stability was a central issue of the “No” campaign (“Voting 'No' only leads to an open election a year later”). 

 

While the Constitution guaranteed institutional stability to the country, regardless of whether the winners were those who voted “Yes” or those who voted “No”, economic stability was not guaranteed. During the campaign, the opposition “Concertación” attacked the free-market model, and even claimed that it had created “5 million people living in poverty”. Thus, many supporters of the free-market model felt pressured to vote “Yes” because it became a “Yes” in favor of the economic model. Due to the opposition’s behavior, the “Yes” option acquired two different meanings: the literal meaning was to approve a new presidential term for general Pinochet; the implicit meaning was to guarantee the stability of the economic model that was freeing Chile from underdevelopment and poverty. 

 

On the other hand, many of those who voted “No” believed that their eventual triumph would dismantle the free-market economic model that had been presented to them as unjust and incorrect. However, the Concertación governed for the next 20 years and kept the essential elements of the model. But they neither defended nor explained it, so people acquired a profound distrust with political parties, a disappointment that continues to this day and constitutes a significant obstacle to the country’s progress. The “social cost” inflicted by the then opposition for having used the easy resource of demagoguery against the economic model to win the 1988 referendum continues to be paid today. 

 

The plebiscite was held on October 5, 1988. The “No” option won 56% of the vote and the “Yes” option 44%. Although the result was clear, its interpretation was not obvious. Although Chileans didn’t grant President Pinochet a new term, they did support the administration’s modernizing legacy. Eugenio Tironi, a sociologist and one of the architects of the “No” political campaign, affirmed that if the candidate had been a civilian, the “Yes” option would have won. He added that if the alternative had been “Pinochet or the revolution”, the “Yes” option would also have won (interview on CNN Chile, June 5, 2013).

 

So, Chile’s return to democracy, driven from the inside, was a success. It would have been even better if President Pinochet, in addition to following the magnificent example of President George Washington, as they were both willing to give up power, had also declined to seek a third term. Invited to discuss the final steps leading to democracy, I proposed to the president a “Washingtonian gesture” and suggested the idea of an historic farewell address (see the 1796 “Farewell Address” by President Washington). But it is possible that personal safety considerations weighed heavily on general Pinochet’s decision to participate in an electoral race for which he didn’t have any experience. The memory of the near-success of the Communist party’s 1986 assassination attempt on him was still present.

 

After the end of the Second World War in 1945, Winston Churchill was also advised not to run for office. The hero of global liberty was subsequently defeated by Labor candidate Clement Attlee. A similar experience happened to De Gaulle, whose opposition challenged him not by attacking his policies, but by a simple “that’s enough” (C’est assez) that alluded to his many years in power. 

 

Unfortunately, instead of contributing to national unity by recognizing the process of returning to democracy from the inside, Chilean center-left leaders invented a black legend according to which President Pinochet was willing to disregard the Constitution. This falsehood has been categorically denied by general Fernando Matthei, member of the Government Junta, in his letter to El Mercurio on January 12, 2012: “I assure my fellow citizens that there was never any uncertainty on the part of either President Pinochet, or any member of the Government Junta, about faithfully respecting the referendum results and strict adherence to the Constitution we gave to the country” (see the complete letter here). In South Africa, under more difficult circumstances, President Nelson Mandela recognized former President De Klerk’s contribution and both leaders won the Nobel Peace Prize for their role in the transition to democracy. In Chile, the attitude was the opposite.

 

The demagoguery employed against the economic model in 1988 and the historical falsification beginning in 1990 are the two great sins committed by the center-left in this process. Their willingness to participate in the redemocratization process and in the referendums of 1988 and 1989, are its two contributions. 

 

The constitutional plebiscite of 1989

 

After the presidential plebiscite, the rules established in the Constitution’s provisional articles to achieve democracy had accomplished their objective. However, some of the permanent articles of the  Constitution were still questioned by the opposition. 

 

This opened a window of opportunity. The center-left wanted a reform in 1989 as they were confident to win the presidential and parliamentary elections at the end of the year, but they did not believe they would achieve the majority required to reform the Constitution and didn’t want to begin their government with a complex constitutional debate. On the other hand, the liberal faction within the government recognized that some of the constitutional articles were unnecessary and, above all, they understood the political and historical value of achieving a consensual constitutional reform by involving the opposition. The stars aligned in 1989 for an historic agreement between the government and the opposition regarding constitutional reform. The most important one was the mechanism by which the Constitution might be reformed in the future. The agreed constitutional reform was announced by President Pinochet on May 30, 1989. On June 15, a referendum was called for July 30. This time, 91% of the people voted “Yes”. 

 

A new political era began then with a Constitution overwhelmingly ratified in a plebiscite and explicitly accepted by the democratic opposition. Edgardo Boeninger, the right hand of President Aylwin in the constitutional negotiation and his future Minister of the Presidency, affirmed that with this referendum “the opposition to the government explicitly accepted the modified Constitution of 1980” (“Democracia en Chile, Lecciones para la gobernabilidad”, 1997).

 

The triumph of the Chilean Model

 

The fulfillment of the process established by the Constitution brought prestige to President Pinochet and his government in a way no other previous event had done, since it confirmed the exceptional nature of the Chilean experience. This process was also praised by the two great leaders of this period: President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The fall of the Berlin wall only four months before Chile’s transfer of power was providential and lifted the veil that shielded the monumental failure of socialism all over the world. 

 

March 11, 1990, the day when the transfer of power to a civilian government democratically elected took place, was what Stefan Zweig would have called a “stellar moment” in Chile’s history. New horizons were opening globally for the ideas and experiences of freedom. An exceptional and successful refoundation of democracy had concluded in Chile. The engine of change had been the government, which consolidated its historic legacy: the economic model, the seven modernizations, and the Constitution of 1980.